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Abstract
Five German leading parties and their coalitions are evaluated from the viewpoint of
direct democracy. For this purpose, the positions of the parties on over 30 topical issues
are compared with the results of polls of public opinion. The outcomes are summarized
in the indices of popularity and universality of the parties and of the DGB (German
Confederation of Trade Unions). The selection of policy issues and the information on
the party positions are given as in the Wahl-O-Mat(2010) for the last Bundestag (German
parliamentary) elections 2009.
It is shown that the Bundestag election winner 2009— the conservative party CDU/CSU
with 33.8% votes — has a quite low representative capacity (fourth among the five leading
parties), whereas the most representative is the left party Linke which received only 11.9%
votes. As for possible coalitions, the most representative would consist of the Linke and
the ecologists Gru¨nen, who received together 22.6% votes and could not make a govern-
ment. It is noteworthy that the DGB is also top evaluated as a good representative of
majority opinions.
The analysis of Bundestag elections 2009 shows that the voters are little consistent with
their own political profiles, disregard party manifestos, and are likely driven by political
traditions, even if outdated, or by personal images of politicians. A possible explanation
is that the spectrum of the German political landscape has significantly shifted to the
right, whereas voters still believe that the parties represent the same values as a few
decades ago. The insufficient focus on the changing party profiles results in a discrepancy
between electorate and elected government. In case of Germany it manifests itself in the
unprecedent violent response of population to some rather usual events like starting the
construction of a new main station in Stuttgart (’Stuttgart-21’), or transporting atomic
waste (’Castor Transport’).
Taking into account the results of the study, some modifications to the election pro-
cedure are proposed to bridge approaches of representative and direct democracy. It is
suggested to introduce the third vote in the form of ’sample referenda’ with voters’ Yes/No
opinions on several important issues from party manifestos. It meets the existing logic
of the German two-vote system: the first vote for a person, the second vote for a party,
and the third vote for party profiles, so that the considerations are getting to be more
conceptual and less personified.
Keywords: Representative democracy, direct democracy, elections, coalitions, theory
of voting, mathematical theory of democracy, indices of popularity and universality.
JEL Classification: D71
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1 Introduction
The difference between direct democracy and representative democracy is in the way
sovereignty is exercised — by the assembly of all citizens, or by elected representatives.
Direct democracy, called also pure democracy, is generally regarded as the most advanced
form of democracy. Respectively, representative democracies sometimes practice elements
of direct democracy — referenda (plebiscites) — on most important political issues.
Shortcomings of representative democracy are caused by some particularities of voting,
and by intermediation of voters’ will by representatives. For instance, the bottle-necks of
simple majority voting are so critical that the legitimacy of election results can be put
in question (Held 1996, Samons 2004). As noticed by Borda as early as in 1770, if no
candidate gets an absolute majority then the election winner can be most undesirable for
an absolute majority. He illustrated it with an example of 21 voters with the rankings of
three candidates A, B, and C shown in Figure 1 (Black 1958, p. 157). Indeed, the election
winner candidate A with 8 votes is the most undesirable for 13 voters of 21.
Rankings
Voters
6 6 6
A
B
C
8
B
C
A
7
C
B
A
6
Figure 1: Borda’s example of 1770 as given by Black (1958)
In similar cases, more information than just the first choices should be considered:
candidate rankings (preferences of electors with second and third priorities), preference
grades, quantitative estimations, etc. However, these methods either have questionable
assumptions, or can result in cyclic orders of candidates. Related problems are studied in
the theory of voting and social choice since the 18 century, however, with no unambiguous
solution. The general theoretical conclusion is that no voting rule is perfect. It is proved
that every voting rule has its limits, in other words, its ’good’ performance is restricted
to certain situations (Mueller 1989).
The imperfectness of intermediation of voters’ will is to a great extent caused by the
irrationality of voters themselves. They are often influenced by a priori judgements or pay
attention to the image of candidates rather than to real merits. At the business level, some
corporations try to overcome subjectivity and irrelevances in evaluation of candidates in
recruitment procedures by considering exclusively job-related matters and anonymous
questionnaires with no names, photos, or any personal information; see Krause et al.
(2010, pp. 8–21) for an international survey. This practice is becoming more widespread,
and Germany has started to shape it into juridical guide-lines (Antidiskriminierungsstelle
des Bundes 2010).
The given paper discusses these two shortcomings of representative democracy, refer-
ring to the German Bundestag elections held on September 27, 2009 (Bundeswahlleiter
2009) with the results displayed in Table 1. Since no party got an absolute majority, the
question emerges if the election winner CDU/CSU and the currently governing coalition
CDU/CSU/FDP are as desired by the population as prompted by the election outcomes.
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Table 1: Results of German parliamentary elections 2009
CDU/CSU SPD FDP die Linke Gru¨nen 22 minor parties
Percentage of votes 33.8 23.0 14.6 11.9 10.7 6.0
SPD is the Social Democratic Party
CDU/CSU is the Christian Democratic Union together with Bavaria’s Christian Social Union (conser-
vators)
FDP is the Free Democratic Party (neoliberals) close to employer organizations
die Linke (Left-Party) is a fusion of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism—former East German com-
munists) with the WASG (Voting Alternative for Employment and Social Justice—the separated
left wing of the SPD)
Gru¨nen (Greens) is the party of ecologists in a broad sense with a social-democratic background
Secondly, the rationality of voters is also put in question, that is, their voting behavior
is asked to be really optimal with regard to their own political profiles.
The analysis is performed from the standpoint of direct democracy. The issues de-
clared in the party manifestos are compared with the results of public opinion polls on
the same issues. Then the parties and coalitions are evaluated with two indicators of rep-
resentativeness — popularity and universality, following (Tangian 2008 and 2010). The
indicators are derived from the size of groups resulting from crosscutting cleavages (Pitkin
1967, Miller 1964, Wright 1978, Miller 1983, and Brams et al. 1998). Both indicators
suggest a kind of correlation measure for estimating the proximity between party posi-
tions and voters’ opinions (Achen 1977, 1978). The crosscutting cleavages are determined
by a number of dichotomous questions (with Yes/No answers), each dividing the society
into two groups, protagonists and antagonists, with positive and negative opinions, re-
spectively. The parties, answering these questions, represent some Yes-groups and some
No-groups. The popularity of a party is measured by the size of the group represented,
averaged on all the questions selected. The universality of a party is the frequency of
representing a majority. One can say that the popularity reflects the spatial aspect of
representativeness, and the universality reflects its temporal aspect.
The required information on the party positions at the time of elections 2009 is avail-
able from the Wahl-O-Mat (Bundeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung 2010). There, the party
positions are specified in a tabular form as Yes/No answers to 38 topical questions (Intro-
duce nation-wide minimal wage? Yes/No; Prolong the operation time of nuclear power
plants? Yes/No, etc.). Besides, the answers for the DGB (German Confederation of Trade
Unions) are provided by the editor of the DGB periodical Einblick Anne Graef.
Recall that the Wahl-O-Mat (’Electomat’) is the German version of the Dutch Inter-
net portal StemWijzer (’VoteMatch’) of the Institute for Public and Politics (2010). Both
web-sites help individuals to locate themselves at the political landscape by testing the
goodness of fit of a potential voter to party positions. Before elections, a special com-
mission formulates a number of questions and addresses them to the parties for reference
answers. The visitor of the web-site also provides answers to these questions, eventually
with weights, and the computer program, having compared them with the party answers,
finds the best-matching party, the second-best matching party, etc.; for details see Bun-
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deszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung (2010). To avoid political speculations, the individual
answers are saved neither in anonymized form, nor as cumulated statistics. Therefore, to
test the goodness of fit of parties to the whole of electorate, which is our goal, we use data
from different public polls listed in Table 10 in the annex.
In our study, the questions on policy issues are considered either unweighted, or
weighted by two experts. The party indices of popularity and universality turn out to be
quite similar for the three weighting methods. The explanation is that the party answers
are determined by the party “ideology” and are therefore highly correlated, making the
overall evaluation little sensitive to question weights. The party indices of popularity and
universality show that the winner of the Bundestag elections 2009 — the conservative
party CDU/CSU with 33.8% votes — has a quite low representative capacity (fourth
among the five leading parties), whereas the most representative is the left party Linke
which received only 11.9% votes. Its low rating in elections can be explained by a bad im-
age of the former GDR communist party, especially in the West Germany. It is noteworthy
that the DGB is also top evaluated as a good representative of majority opinions.
Besides, a kind of coalition formation analysis is performed; for theoretical references
see van Deemen (1997) and de Vries (1999). All coalitions with two and three parties
are evaluated. The most representative one would consist of Linke and Gru¨nen, who
received together 22.6% votes and therefore could not make a government. It is noteworthy
that the currently governing coalition CDU/CSU/FDP is constituted by the two least
representative parties among the five. The coalition itself is the least popular and the
least universal from all imaginable coalitions.
Thus, the analysis of Bundestag elections 2009 shows that the voters are little con-
sistent with their own political profiles, disregard party manifestos, and are likely driven
by political traditions, even if outdated, or by personal images of politicians. A possi-
ble explanation is that the spectrum of the German political landscape has significantly
shifted to the right, whereas voters still believe that the parties represent the same values
as a few decades ago. The insufficient attention to party profiles results in a discrepancy
between electorate and elected government. In case of Germany it manifests itself in the
unprecedent violent response of population to some rather usual events like starting the
construction of a new main station in Stuttgart (Protest gegen Stuttgart 21, 2010), or
transporting atomic waste (Castor-Transport geht auf schwierigste Etappe 2010).
Taking into account the results of the study, some modifications to the election pro-
cedure are proposed to bridge approaches of representative and direct democracy. It is
suggested to introduce the third vote in the form of ’sample referenda’ with voters’ Yes/No
opinions on several important issues from party manifestos. It meets the existing logic
of the German two-vote system: the first vote for a person, the second vote for a party,
and the third vote for party profiles, so that the considerations are getting to be more
conceptual and less personified. An example of application is developed with the data of
the German parliamentary elections 2009.
In Section 2, “Indicators of popularity and universality”, initial data (over 30 questions
with weights and party answers), basic assumptions, and indicators of popularity and
universality of parties are introduced.
In Section 3, “Evaluation of parties”, the indicators of popularity and universality of
parties and DGB are calculated.
In Section 4, “Evaluation of coalitions”, the indicators of popularity and universality
are extended to coalitions with two and three parties.
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In Section 5, “Elections with elements of direct democracy”, a method of elections
based on evaluation of candidate profiles with the indices or representativeness is proposed
and, for illustration, applied to the data of the German parliamentary elections 2009.
In Section 6, “Conclusions”, the main statements of the paper are recapitulated.
In Section 7, “Annex 1: Computational issues”, the mathematical model is rigorously
described and computation formulas are derived.
In Section 8, “Annex 2: Polls of public opinion”, the Internet links to the data sources
are provided.
2 Indicators of popularity and universality
Table 2 displays the data for the study. The first section contains Yes/No answers of
five leading German parties and of DGB to the 38 Wahl-O-Mat questions grouped into
thematic topics. The answers for the parties are given by the parties themselves and
are available from the Wahl-O-Mat (Bundeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung 2010). A few
missed answers for the questions marked with * are made up from party public statements,
voting in the parliament, etc. by Matthias Ho¨lzlein (2010). The answers for the DGB are
given by the editor of the DGB periodical Einblick Anne Graef.
The second section of Table 2 contains the question weights in the range 1–5 suggested
by two experts from the Hans-Bo¨ckler-Stiftung (political foundation of the DGB) — by
the director of the Institute for Economic and Social Research Claus Scha¨fer and by
the director of the archive of collective agreements Reinhard Bispink. The last section
contains the results of public opinion polls; for the sources see Table 10 in Annex 2. The
public polls cover 32 of 38 questions, and only these questions are used in further analysis.
Table 2 is visualized by Figure 2. To explain the figure, consider the top question:
’2. Introduce nation-wide minimal wage’. Each party is shown by a rectangle with the
’official’ party color, which length is proportional to the number of the party seats in the
Bundestag. The ’No/Yes’ party opinion on the question is reflected by the location of the
rectangle to the left side or to the right side from the central vertical axis, respectively.
A Bundestag majority is attained if the cumulative length of party rectangles surpasses
the 50%-threshold (marked with dotted lines). The results of the relevant public survey
are shown by the blue bar with the length normalized to 100% (abstaining respondents
are ignored). Its bias from the center indicates at the prevailing social opinion. The small
red rectangle of the DGB has no quantitative meaning but only indicates the ’Yes/No’
position.
For every question, a given party represents either a majority, or a minority of the
population (identified with the fraction in the opinion polls). For instance, the CDU/CSU
(black rectangle) with the ’No’ answer to the top question ’2. Introduce nation-wide
minimal wage’ represents the opinion of 43% of the population against 52%; see Table 2
for exact figures. After normalization, we obtain that its representativeness for question
2 is
rCDU/CSU,2 =
43
43 + 52
· 100% ≈ 45% .
Similarly, with the ’No’ answer to the next question ’17. Relax protection against dis-
missals’, the CDU/CSU expresses the opinion of 82% of the population against 17%.
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Party positions and votes received, in % Question weights 1–5 Survey results, in %
The Wahl-O-Mat question number
and the question (shortly formulated)
CDU/CSU SPD FDP Linke Gruenen DGB 1st expert 2nd expert Protagonists Antagonists
33.8 23.0 14.6 11.9 10.7 0.0 Schaefer Bispink
Labour market
2. Introduce nation-wide minimal
wage
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 5 5 52 43
17. Relax protection against dis-
missals
No No Yes No No No 5 5 17 82
Economy and taxes
24. Exclusive governmental owernship
of railways
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 5 3 70 28
10. Equity holding by government in
private banks has to be temporary
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 3 3 28 67
5. No state control over top-
management salaries*
Yes Yes Yes No No No 4 4 30 67
13. Decrease corporate taxes Yes No Yes No No No 5 3 23 59
28. Reintroduce a wealth tax* No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 5 5 35 65
Environment
1. Prolong the operation time of nu-
clear power plants
Yes No Yes No No No 3 4 39 55
19. Introduce a general speed limit on
Autobahnen (German motorways)
No Yes No Yes Yes No 1 1 34 41
9. Unexceptionally ban experiments
on animals
No No No Yes Yes No 1 1 19 80
26. Authorize production of geneti-
cally modified food*
Yes Yes Yes No No No 3 3 33 67
22. More subsidies for eco-farming ?? Yes No Yes Yes Yes 4 2 No data No data
* Adjustments to non-specified party positions based on public statements, parliament voting, etc.
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CDU/CSU SPD FDP Linke Gruenen DGB 1st expert 2nd expert Protagonists Antagonists
33.8 23.0 14.6 11.9 10.7 0.0 Schaefer Bispink
Social policy
36. Increase significantly unemploy-
ment benefits (Hartz IV)*
No No No Yes Yes Yes 5 5 48 36
32. If wages decrease, pensions can be
reduced*
No No Yes No Yes No 5 4 28 68
31. No Praxisgebuehr (quarterly fee
for medical visits)
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 3 71 26
15. Compensation to parents who use
no public daycares
Yes No No No No No 4 2 65 33
Education
29. Leave the education policy under
the authority of the states
Yes No Yes No No Yes 5 3 9 81
34. Leave 3 types of schools with dif-
ferent access to further education
Yes No Yes No No Yes 5 2 63 31
16. Guarantee an apprenticeship
training position for every adoles-
cent*
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 3 4 81 19
7. The first university degree should
be free of tuition fees*
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 5 4 53 47
8. Obligatory language test for all
children of preschool age
Yes Yes Yes ?? Yes Yes 3 2 No data No data
20. BAFOeG (aid to students and
trainees) regardless of parent in-
come
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 3 No data No data
Gender
12. There should be a quota for
women in leading positions
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 3 2 34 64
27. Full adoption rights for homosex-
ual couples
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 1 51 49
* Adjustments to non-specified party positions based on public statements, parliament voting, etc.
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Domestic policy
6. Prohibit secret online surveillance
of private computers
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 2 39 57
25. Retain the compulsory military
service
Yes No No No No Yes 3 2 41 53
37. Allow domestic use of German mil-
itary forces against terrorism
Yes No No No No No 3 3 69 28
14. Introduce referenda at the federal
level
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 3 68 26
23. German politics should follow
Christian values*
Yes No No No No No 1 1 73 20
38. The German democracy is the best
form of government
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 2 77 11
35. Municipal voting rights for foreign
permanent residents
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 3 44 42
30. Less restriction on asylum policy No No ?? Yes Yes Yes 3 2 No data No data
Foreign policy
3. Immediate withdrawl of German
troops from Afghanistan
No No No Yes No Yes 5 2 57 37
11. No trade relations with govern-
ments who violate human rights
?? No ?? No ?? No 3 2 No data No data
33. General export prohibition of mil-
itary materials
No No No Yes ?? No 3 3 No data No data
European policy
4. Germany should leave the Euro-
pean Union
No No No No No No 1 4 12 86
18. Turkey should be a full member of
the European Union
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 37 58
* Adjustments to non-specified party positions based on public statements, parliament voting, etc.
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After normalization we obtain its representativeness for question 17
rCDU/CSU,17 =
82
82 + 17
· 100% ≈ 83% ,
and so on. Taking the average representativeness of the CDU/CSU over the 32 questions
with known results of public polls, we obtain the index of popularity of the party
PCDU/CSU = 52% .
Generally, a higher popularity means that a larger fraction of the electorate is represented.
The frequency of representing a majority (≥ 50%) is defined to be the universality of
the party. As one can see, the CDU/CSU represents a majority on 15 questions from 32,
that is, with the frequency
UCDU/CSU =
15
32
· 100% ≈ 47% .
A higher universality means that a majority is represented more frequently. For instance
the Linke represents a majority on 22 of 32 questions, resulting in 69%-universality.
The indices of popularity and universality are also computed with weight coefficients
of the questions which reflect their relative importance. Then the popularity is defined
to be the weighted average representativeness, and the universality is defined to be the
weighted frequency of representing a majority; for details see Section 7.
3 Evaluation of parties
The popularity and universality indices of parties, DGB, and Bundestag (determined
by a Bundestag majority) are shown in Table 3 and Figure 3 in three versions: for
equally important questions (unweighted), and weighted by two experts. For reference,
the bottom row of Table 3 shows the absolute maximum of the indicators which could
be attained if majority opinions were represented on all the questions. Besides, Table 3
gives ranks of the indices in every column. The fractional rank 2.5 in the first universality
column means that Linke and DGB share the second and third places.
Which conclusions do follow from the indices computed?
• Inconsistency of election results with public opinion
The party indices of popularity and universality show that the winner of the Bun-
destag elections 2009 — the conservative party CDU/CSU with 33.8% votes — has
a quite low representative capacity (fourth among the five leading parties). The
second actually governing party — the neo-liberal FDP — is bottom-ranked in all
the evaluations. The latter is explained by the fact that the business-friendly FDP
represents rather employers, who constitute a minority of the population.
The most representative is the left party Linke which received only 11.9% votes. In
spite of a high representative capacity, the Linke got almost three times fewer votes
than the CDU/CSU. It can be explained by the traditional orientation of German
voters towards two major parties — CDU/CSU and SPD, by a bad image of the
former GDR communist party, especially in the West Germany, and not least by a
little attention of voters to party manifestos.
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Figure 2: What do the voters give their votes for?
100% 50% 0% 50% 100%
21. Reintriduce the D−Mark
18. Turkey should be a full member of the European Union
4. Germany should leave the European Union
33. General export prohibition of military materials
11. No trade relations with governments who violate human rights
3. Immediate withdrawl of German troops from Afghanistan
30. Less restriction on asylum policy
35. Municipal voting rights for foreign permanent residents
38. The German democracy is the best form of government
23. German politics should follow Christian values*
14. Introduce referenda at the federal level
37. Allow domestic use of German military forces against terrorism
25. Retain the compulsory military service
6. Prohibit secret online surveillance of private computers
27. Full adoption rights for homosexual couples
12. There should be a quota for women in leading positions
20. BAFOeG (aid to students and trainees) regardless of parent income
8. Obligatory language test for all children of preschool age
7. The first university degree should be free of tuition fees*
16. Guarantee an apprenticeship training position for every adolescent*
34. Leave 3 types of schools with different access to further education
29. Leave the education policy under the authority of the states
15. Compensation to parents who use no public daycares
31. No Praxisgebuehr (quarterly fee for medical visits)
32. If wages decrease, pensions can be reduced*
36. Increase significantly unemployment benefits (Hartz IV)*
22. More subsidies for eco−farming
26. Authorize production of genetically modified food*
9. Unexceptionally ban experiments on animals
19. Introduce a general speed limit on Autobahnen (German motorways)
1. Prolong the operation time of nuclear power plants
28. Reintroduce a wealth tax*
13. Decrease corporate taxes
5. No state control over top−management salaries*
10. Equity holding by government in private banks has to be temporary
24. Exclusive governmental owernship of railways
17. Relax protection against dismissals
2. Introduce nation−wide minimal wage
 
Labour market
Economy and taxes
Environment
Social policy
Education
Gender
Domestic policy
Foreign policy
European policy
     , Opinions in public surveys      , DGB      , Gruenen       , Linke        , FDP           , SPD                CDU/CSU 
Balance of opinions in the society and its representation by party seats in the Bundestag and by the DGB
NO YES
Percentage of NO/YES votes
* Adjustments to non-specified party positions based on public statements, parliament voting, etc.
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Table 3: Indices of parties, DGB, and Bundestag with their ranks
Votes Popularity Universality
% Unweighted 1st Expert 2nd Expert Unweighted 1st Expert 2nd Expert
CDU/CSU 33.8 52 / 6 49 / 6 50 / 6 47 / 7 39 / 7 42 / 7
SPD 23.0 54 / 5 53 / 5 55 / 5 56 / 5 55 / 5 59 / 5
FDP 14.6 47 / 8 44 / 8 45 / 8 44 / 8 36 / 8 37 / 8
Linke 11.9 57 / 2 59 / 2 61 / 2 69 / 2.5 74 / 2 77 / 2
Gruenen 10.7 54 / 4 55 / 4 57 / 4 59 / 4 63 / 4 67 / 4
DGB 56 / 3 56 / 3 58 / 3 69 / 2.5 71 / 3 73 / 3
Bundestag 50 / 7 47 / 7 49 / 7 50 / 6 43 / 6 45 / 6
Abs. limit 68 / 1 67 / 1 68 / 1 100 / 1 100 / 1 100 / 1
• Secondary role of weighting
As seen from Table 3, the three weightings of the questions do not affect the indi-
cators’ order. The ranks of the party indices are the same for all the parties and
DGB. A minor difference in universality ranks is caused by the fact that both the
Linke and DGB have the same index of unweighted universality 67% and both get
the same rank 2.5.
The similarity in index orders can be explained as follows. Answers of a party are
backed up by the party “ideology” which determines a high intra-question corre-
lations. Therefore, ‘erroneous’-weighting and even omitting some questions play a
rather negligible role, because other questions carry superfluous information on the
party position. Henceforth, only unweighted indicators will be considered.
Note that the weighted indices are lower for CDU/CSU and FDP, higher for the
Linke and Gru¨nen, and rather constant for SPD and DGB. It says that the experts
give less weights to the issues where the conservative or business-friendly party
is highly representative, and give more weights to the issues where the left party
and the Greens express the opinion of a majority. In case of politically centrally-
located SPD and DGB, the expert weighting does not change much the total balance
between more and less popular opinions.
• Evaluation of representativeness with no dedicated surveys
The DGB position on party manifestos allows us to evaluate its popularity and
universality, although DGB does not participate in elections. The high indices of
DGB mean that trade unions are top-representative in Germany, expressing major-
ity opinions on most issues.
Thus, the representativeness of any political body can be evaluated without elec-
tions, just by comparing its position with the results of public opinion polls.
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Figure 3: Indices of parties, DGB, and Bundestag with their ranks; P – popularity, U –
universality, (u) for unweighted questions, (1) weighted by the 1st expert, and (2) weighted
by the second expert
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
Po
pu
la
rit
y 
(av
era
ge
 re
pre
sen
tat
ive
ne
ss)
 an
d U
niv
ers
ali
ty 
(fr
eq
ue
nc
y o
f m
ajo
rity
 re
pre
sen
tat
ion
), i
n %
CDU/CSU
33.8%
SPD
23.0%
FDP
14.6%
Linke
11.9%
Gruenen
10.7%
DGB Bundestag
52
u
P
49
1
50
2
47
u
U
39
1
42
2
54
u
P
53
1
55
2
56
u
U
55
1
59
2
47
u
P
44
1
45
2
44
u
U
36
1
37
2
57
u
P
59
1
61
2
69
u
U
74
1
77
2
54
u
P
55
1
57
2
59
u
U
63
1
67
2
56
u
P
56
1
58
2
69
u
U
71
1
73
2
50
u
P
47
1
49
2
50
u
U
43
1
45
2
17
4 Evaluation of coalitions
Table 4 displays the parties and all imaginable coalitions with up to three parties together
with their indices of popularity and universality for unweighted questions (as explained
previously, weighting plays a secondary role). The first column contains the names of
parties which constitute the coalition. The second column shows the coalition weight in
% of parliament seats1. For example, the first two-party coalition CDU/CSU/SPD has
the percentage of parliament seats
Parliamentary weight of CDU/CSU/SPD =
33.8 + 23.0
94.0
· 100% = 60.4% .
The third column shows the degree of unanimity of the coalition, expressed in % of
questions on which all the coalition members agree, also with ranking. Obviously, single
parties are 100%-unanimous and get the 1st rank. The most unanimous coalitions are:
Linke/Gru¨nen (rank 2, 90.6% = 29/32 questions), SPD/Gru¨nen (rank 3, 78.1% = 25/32
questions), SPD/Linke (rank 4, 75% = 24/32 questions), and SPD/Linke/Gru¨nen (rank
5, 71.9% = 23/32 questions).
One can suppose that if a coalition is not unanimous on a certain question then the
probabilities of its Yes/No answers are proportional to the protagonist-to-antagonist ratio
within the coalition (ratio of party weights expressed in parliament seats). However, as
evidenced by politicians, the reality is even more uncertain. To deal with the uncertainty,
introduce the parameter p — proportionality of party impact to party weights.
For example, let the protagonist-to-antagonist ratio within a coalition be 3 : 1. The
p = 1 means the full probabilistic impact of party weights, that is, the larger party
determines the coalition opinions with the probability 3
3+1
= 3
4
, and the smaller party
with probability 1
4
. The p = 0 means no probabilistic impact of party weights, that is,
each of alternative opinions is accepted with equal chances 1
2
. The p = 1
3
means that
the probabilistic impact of party weights is a mix of the two extreme cases, so that the
Yes/No answers are adopted by the coalition with the following probabilities
Probability of ’Yes’ =
3
4︸︷︷︸
full
weight
impact
·
1
3︸︷︷︸
p
mix
factor
+
1
2︸︷︷︸
no
weight
impact
·
(
1−
1
3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1− p
mix
factor
=
7
12
Probability of ’No’ =
1
4
·
1
3
+
1
2
·
(
1−
1
3
)
=
5
12
.
Throughout the paper, a medium uncertainty is assumed, and p = 1
2
is applied to all
coalitions considered.
Under this assumption, both indicators of popularity and universality turn out to be
random variables. The coalition’s popularity and universality are understood, respec-
tively, as the expected size of the voter group represented, and as the expected frequency
of representing a majority. These indices are given in the corresponding columns ’Ex-
pectation’ of Table 4. The indices are also characterized by their standard deviations,
1The figures result from the reduction of votes for parties to the total votes for the parties in the
parliament, here 94% (small adjustments of the number of parliament seats prescribed by the German
constitution are not taken into account). Therefore, the coalition CDU/CSU/FDP with 48.4% votes has
51.5% parliament seats, constituting the parliament majority.
18
Table 4: Indices of parties and coalitions with up to three parties for unweighted questions;
the coefficient of impact of member weights on the coalition decisions p = 0.50
Nr. Parliament seats Unanimity Popularity Universality
Members of the coalition Expec-
tation
Stan-
dard
devia-
tion
Expec-
tation
Stan-
dard
devia-
tion
%/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank
1 CDU/CSU 36.0 / 17 100.0 / 1 51.7 / 18 ±0.0 / 1 46.9 / 23 ±0.0 / 1
2 SPD 24.5 / 21 100.0 / 1 53.7 / 9 ±0.0 / 1 56.3 / 7 ±0.0 / 1
3 FDP 15.5 / 23 100.0 / 1 47.0 / 25 ±0.0 / 1 43.8 / 25 ±0.0 / 1
4 Linke 12.7 / 24 100.0 / 1 57.3 / 1 ±0.0 / 1 68.8 / 1 ±0.0 / 1
5 Gruenen 11.4 / 25 100.0 / 1 54.1 / 5 ±0.0 / 1 59.4 / 5 ±0.0 / 1
6 CDU/CSU/SPD 60.4 / 6 40.6 / 9 52.6 / 12 ±2.5 / 7 51.1 / 18 ±6.8 / 9
7 CDU/CSU/FDP 51.5 / 9 65.6 / 6 49.8 / 24 ±2.0 / 6 45.6 / 24 ±5.1 / 6
8 CDU/CSU/Linke 48.6 / 11 15.6 / 14 53.8 / 8 ±2.9 / 16 55.2 / 12 ±7.9 / 18
9 CDU/CSU/Gruenen 47.3 / 13 18.8 / 13 52.6 / 13 ±2.9 / 15 51.5 / 17 ±7.7 / 15
10 SPD/FDP 40.0 / 14 50.0 / 7 50.8 / 22 ±2.5 / 8 50.7 / 20 ±6.2 / 7
11 SPD/Linke 37.1 / 16 75.0 / 4 55.2 / 3 ±1.6 / 4 61.5 / 3 ±4.4 / 4
12 SPD/Gruenen 35.9 / 18 78.1 / 3 53.9 / 7 ±1.6 / 3 57.5 / 6 ±4.1 / 3
13 FDP/Linke 28.2 / 19 37.5 / 10 51.9 / 17 ±2.8 / 12 55.6 / 11 ±7.0 / 12
14 FDP/Gruenen 26.9 / 20 46.9 / 8 50.3 / 23 ±2.6 / 9 51.0 / 19 ±6.4 / 8
15 Linke/Gruenen 24.0 / 22 90.6 / 2 55.7 / 2 ±1.0 / 2 64.2 / 2 ±2.7 / 2
16 CDU/CSU/SPD/FDP 76.0 / 1 28.1 / 12 51.4 / 19 ±2.9 / 13 48.8 / 22 ±7.4 / 14
17 CDU/CSU/SPD/Linke 73.1 / 2 15.6 / 14 53.9 / 6 ±3.0 / 18 55.8 / 10 ±8.0 / 19
18 CDU/CSU/SPD/Gruenen 71.8 / 3 18.8 / 13 52.8 / 11 ±3.0 / 17 52.6 / 15 ±7.8 / 16
19 CDU/CSU/FDP/Linke 64.1 / 4 9.4 / 16 52.3 / 15 ±3.2 / 21 52.6 / 16 ±8.1 / 20
20 CDU/CSU/FDP/Gruenen 62.9 / 5 15.6 / 14 51.4 / 20 ±3.1 / 20 50.0 / 21 ±7.9 / 17
21 CDU/CSU/Linke/Gruenen 60.0 / 7 12.5 / 15 53.6 / 10 ±3.1 / 19 55.1 / 13 ±8.2 / 21
22 SPD/FDP/Linke 52.7 / 8 31.3 / 11 52.2 / 16 ±2.9 / 14 55.9 / 9 ±7.2 / 13
23 SPD/FDP/Gruenen 51.4 / 10 37.5 / 10 51.3 / 21 ±2.8 / 10 53.1 / 14 ±6.8 / 10
24 SPD/Linke/Gruenen 48.5 / 12 71.9 / 5 54.8 / 4 ±1.8 / 5 60.6 / 4 ±4.6 / 5
25 FDP/Linke/Gruenen 39.6 / 15 37.5 / 10 52.3 / 14 ±2.8 / 11 56.2 / 8 ±6.9 / 11
Table 5: Correlations ρ between the indicators and P-values
For all coalitions For coalitions with > 50% seats
Popularity Universality Unanimity Popularity Universality Unanimity
Popularity 1.00 / 0.00 0.91 / 0.00 0.16 / 0.45 1.00 / 0.00 0.81 / 0.00 -0.71 / 0.02
Universality 1.00 / 0.00 0.26 / 0.20 1.00 / 0.00 -0.62 / 0.06
Unanimity 1.00 / 0.00 1.00 / 0.00
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which can be interpreted as the prediction accuracy. As one can see, the highest expected
indices of properly coalitions, as well as the best prediction accuracy (all with rank 2,
since rank 1 has the party Linke) are inherent in the coalition Linke/Gru¨nen.
The correlation between the three indicators is shown in Table 5. The indices of popu-
larity and universality are highly correlated, which is explained by their formal definitions
(2) and (3). Their correlation with the unanimity indices is not that high, meaning that
the unanimity of a coalition has little to do with its representative capacity. The location
of coalitions in the space Popularity–Universality–Unanimity is depicted in Figures 4 and
5, where coalitions are aligned along the diagonal in the bottom plane, exhibiting the
correlation between the indices of popularity and universality.
The main findings are as follows:
• The size of coalition is not a criterion of representativeness
Figure 4 illustrates that the smallest coalition Linke/Gru¨nen is the most repre-
sentative with regard to both indicators. Since both parties received together 24%
parliament seats, the coalition could not rule, whereas the currently governing coali-
tion CDU/CSU/FDP with 51.5% parliament seats is the least popular and the least
universal among all coalitions, to say nothing about large coalitions with a majority
of parliament seats shown in Figure 5.
Therefore, the coalition size is not an adequate criterion of coalition representative-
ness.
• Coalition formation can reduce the parliament representativeness
The actual practice of coalition formation aimed at attaining a parliamentary major-
ity can decrease the representativeness of the elected parliament. Indeed, popularity
and universality indices of the elected parliament are both 50% (see Table 3 and Fig-
ure 3), whereas these indices for the currently governing coalition CDU/CSU/FDP
are 49.8 and 45.6%, respectively.
This means that the practice of coalition formation can contradict the objectives of
representative democracy.
5 Elections with elements of direct democracy
The findings of the paper show that the performance of representative democracy regarded
from the viewpoint of direct democracy is far from being perfect. At the same time, the
evaluation framework developed in the paper prompts a way to improve the election
procedure. In case of Germany, one can imagine the third vote in the form of ’sample
referenda’ with voters’ Yes/No opinions on several important issues from party manifestos.
It meets the existing logic of the German two-vote system: the first vote for a person, the
second vote for a party, and the third vote for party profile, so that the considerations
are getting to be more conceptual and less personified.
The aiming is (a) to redirect the voters’ attention from candidates as persons to their
manifestos as political profiles, and (b) to base the election of candidates on matching
their profiles to the majority will. Technically, ballots could contain a number of Yes/No
questions asking for the voter position on the issues in the candidate manifestos. As
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Figure 4: Indices of parties and coalitions with up to three parties for unweighted ques-
tions; the coefficient of impact of member weights on the coalition decisions p = 0.50
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Figure 5: Indices of parties and coalitions with up to three parties having at least half the
parliament seats for unweighted questions; the coefficient of impact of member weights
on the coalition decisions p = 0.50
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mentioned earlier, there is a strong correlation between answers to selected questions
determined by party ideologies, so that a sample of questions provides a quite reliable
basis for specifying political profiles both of voters and candidates. Parties themselves
can formulate the important questions and specify their positions.
The first method of election is based on processing each single ballot and finding the
best-matching candidate who then receives the given vote. It does not change the election
procedure itself, but only enhances the purposeful dedication of votes. Here, the irrational
behavior of voters can be overcome. In fact, this method is implemented in the advisory
option of the Wahl-O-Mat.
The second method is based on processing the totality of ballots. After the balance of
electorate opinions on the issues has been revealed, the candidates should be matched to
the profile of the whole of electorate. The evaluation of their representative capacity can be
done with aggregate indices like popularity or universality used as a reference to distribute
parliament seats. This method is equivalent to performing a series of referenda and
integrates elements of direct democracy in the election procedure. Thereby no candidate
little desired by a majority can be elected, and no cyclic orders can emerge (Mueler 1989),
because candidates are indexed, and indices have no cycles.
Let us illustrate the second method with the data from Table 22. First of all select
the ’most important’ reference indicator. For this purpose, apply principle component
analysis to the parties and coalitions in the Popularity–Universality–Unanimity space
shown in Figures 4 and 53. As seen from Tables 6 and 7, the contribution of universality
absolutely predominates in the first two (most important) components. Consequently,
the universality is regarded as more important than popularity.
Now ’adjust votes’ for parties (in fact, new parliamentary weights) proportionally to
the party (unweighted) universality indices from Table 3 and Figure 3. For instance,
Adjusted votes for CDU/CSU =
Universality
of CDU/CSU︷︸︸︷
47
47 + 56 + 44 + 69 + 59︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sum of universality indices
of the five leading parties
· 100% = 17% .
Proceeding in the same way, we obtain the column ’Votes’ in Table 8. The indices of Pop-
ularity and Universality of the parties remain obviously the same, and only the Bundestag
indicators are adjusted to the new number of party seats. Repeating the computations
from Section 4 for coalitions with ’adjusted votes’, we obtain Table 9 and Figure 6.
Now no two parties build a governing coalition, and every three-party coalition includes
the ’election winner’ — the Linke. The most representative coalition is SPD/Linke/Gru¨nen,
that is, contains the three most representative parties from Table 3 and Figire 3.
2It is not possible to illustrate the first method with real figures, because individual opinions on policy
issues are available neither from Wahl-O-Mat, nor from public opinion polls.
3Principle component analysis is aimed at reducing the dimensionality of observations with least losses
of information (here, from two dimensions of parties and coalitions — popularity and universality — only
one has to be retained). For this purpose, the location of the cloud of observations is approximated by an
ellipsoid, which first diameter is the vector of the maximal variance, the second diameter is the vector of
the second largest variance, etc. (Jackson 1988, Krzanowski 1988, and Seber 1984). The largest diameter
is regarded as the main component in the observations, indicating at ’most important’ dimensions.
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Table 6: Principal components for three indicators
For all coalitions For coalitions with > 50% seats
First
compo-
nent
Second
compo-
nent
Third
compo-
nent
First
compo-
nent
Second
compo-
nent
Third
compo-
nent
Popularity 0.0107 0.3314 0.9434 −0.0507 0.2230 0.9735
Universality 0.0472 0.9423 −0.3316 −0.1198 0.9663 −0.2276
Unanimity 0.9988 −0.0481 0.0056 0.9915 0.1282 0.0222
Standard deviation w.r.t. new axes 33.0478 5.8496 0.8108 17.3108 2.6199 0.6124
Table 7: Principal components for indicators of popularity and universality only
For all coalitions For coalitions with > 50% seats
First
component
Second
component
First
component
Second
component
Popularity 0.3241 0.9460 0.2987 0.9543
Universality 0.9460 −0.3241 0.9543 −0.2987
Standard deviation w.r.t. new axes 6.0551 0.8302 3.4262 0.6779
Table 8: Indices of parties, DGB, and Bundestag with their ranks if the votes for parties
were proportional to their universality
Votes Popularity Universality
% Unweighted 1st Expert 2nd Expert Unweighted 1st Expert 2nd Expert
CDU/CSU 17.0 52 / 7 49 / 7 50 / 7 47 / 7 39 / 7 42 / 7
SPD 20.5 54 / 6 53 / 6 55 / 6 56 / 5.5 55 / 6 59 / 6
FDP 15.9 47 / 8 44 / 8 45 / 8 44 / 8 36 / 8 37 / 8
Linke 25.0 57 / 2 59 / 2 61 / 2 69 / 2.5 74 / 2 77 / 2
Gruenen 21.6 54 / 5 55 / 4 57 / 4 59 / 4 63 / 4 67 / 4
DGB 56 / 3 56 / 3 58 / 3 69 / 2.5 71 / 3 73 / 3
Bundestag 55 / 4 55 / 5 56 / 5 56 / 5.5 57 / 5 60 / 5
Abs. limit 68 / 1 67 / 1 68 / 1 100 / 1 100 / 1 100 / 1
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Table 9: Indices of parties and coalitions with up to three parties if the votes for parties
were proportional to their universality for unweighted questions; the coefficient of impact
of member weights on the coalition decisions p = 0.50
Nr. Parliament seats Unanimity Popularity Universality
Members of the coalition Expec-
tation
Stan-
dard
devia-
tion
Expec-
tation
Stan-
dard
devia-
tion
%/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank
1 CDU/CSU 17.0 / 21 100.0 / 1 51.7 / 18 ±0.0 / 1 46.9 / 23 ±0.0 / 1
2 SPD 20.5 / 20 100.0 / 1 53.7 / 10 ±0.0 / 1 56.3 / 13 ±0.0 / 1
3 FDP 15.9 / 22 100.0 / 1 47.0 / 25 ±0.0 / 1 43.8 / 25 ±0.0 / 1
4 Linke 25.0 / 18 100.0 / 1 57.3 / 1 ±0.0 / 1 68.8 / 1 ±0.0 / 1
5 Gruenen 21.6 / 19 100.0 / 1 54.1 / 8 ±0.0 / 1 59.4 / 5 ±0.0 / 1
6 CDU/CSU/SPD 37.5 / 15 40.6 / 9 52.8 / 15 ±2.5 / 7 51.8 / 19 ±6.8 / 10
7 CDU/CSU/FDP 33.0 / 17 65.6 / 6 49.4 / 24 ±2.0 / 6 45.3 / 24 ±5.2 / 6
8 CDU/CSU/Linke 42.0 / 12 15.6 / 14 54.8 / 5 ±3.0 / 18 58.8 / 6 ±8.1 / 20
9 CDU/CSU/Gruenen 38.6 / 14 18.8 / 13 53.0 / 12 ±3.0 / 17 53.5 / 17 ±8.0 / 16
10 SPD/FDP 36.4 / 16 50.0 / 7 50.6 / 23 ±2.5 / 8 50.4 / 21 ±6.2 / 7
11 SPD/Linke 45.5 / 10 75.0 / 4 55.6 / 3 ±1.7 / 4 62.8 / 3 ±4.4 / 4
12 SPD/Gruenen 42.0 / 11 78.1 / 3 53.9 / 9 ±1.6 / 3 57.8 / 9 ±4.1 / 3
13 FDP/Linke 40.9 / 13 37.5 / 10 52.7 / 16 ±2.8 / 12 57.6 / 11 ±6.9 / 12
14 FDP/Gruenen 37.5 / 15 46.9 / 8 50.8 / 22 ±2.6 / 9 52.2 / 18 ±6.4 / 8
15 Linke/Gruenen 46.6 / 9 90.6 / 2 55.8 / 2 ±1.0 / 2 64.2 / 2 ±2.7 / 2
16 CDU/CSU/SPD/FDP 53.4 / 8 28.1 / 12 51.3 / 21 ±2.9 / 14 49.0 / 22 ±7.4 / 14
17 CDU/CSU/SPD/Linke 62.5 / 3 15.6 / 14 54.6 / 6 ±3.0 / 16 58.3 / 7 ±8.0 / 17
18 CDU/CSU/SPD/Gruenen 59.1 / 5 18.8 / 13 53.1 / 11 ±3.0 / 15 53.9 / 15 ±7.8 / 15
19 CDU/CSU/FDP/Linke 58.0 / 6 9.4 / 16 52.8 / 14 ±3.2 / 21 55.1 / 14 ±8.3 / 21
20 CDU/CSU/FDP/Gruenen 54.5 / 7 15.6 / 14 51.6 / 19 ±3.1 / 20 51.2 / 20 ±8.0 / 18
21 CDU/CSU/Linke/Gruenen 63.6 / 2 12.5 / 15 54.3 / 7 ±3.0 / 19 58.0 / 8 ±8.1 / 19
22 SPD/FDP/Linke 61.4 / 4 31.3 / 11 52.6 / 17 ±2.9 / 13 57.2 / 12 ±7.2 / 13
23 SPD/FDP/Gruenen 58.0 / 6 37.5 / 10 51.4 / 20 ±2.8 / 11 53.6 / 16 ±6.8 / 11
24 SPD/Linke/Gruenen 67.0 / 1 71.9 / 5 55.0 / 4 ±1.8 / 5 61.4 / 4 ±4.6 / 5
25 FDP/Linke/Gruenen 62.5 / 3 37.5 / 10 52.9 / 13 ±2.8 / 10 57.7 / 10 ±6.8 / 9
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Of course, this example is provided just for illustration. A practical implementation
should not exclude traditional ways of expressing opinions. Additionally to questionnaires
in the ballots, a direct vote for a candidate should be the option. Note that such a voting
duality is already inherent in the German parliamentary election system with the first
vote for a specific person, and the second vote for a party. In our consideration, the vote
for a party is replaced by a vote for an even more impersonal party manifesto.
6 Conclusions
Our analysis of the German Bundestag elections 2009 shows that voters are little consis-
tent with their own political profiles, disregard party manifestos, and are likely driven by
political traditions, even if outdated, or by personal images of politicians. A possible ex-
planation is that the spectrum of the German political landscape has significantly shifted
to the right, whereas voters still believe that the parties represent the same values as a
few decades ago. All of these result in election of ’wrong’ parties and ’wrong’ coalition
formation. In case of the German parliamentary elections 2009, the two governing par-
ties are the least representative among the five leading ones, and the governing coalition
CDU/CSU/FDP is the least representative among all imaginable coalitions. The insuffi-
cient focus on the changing party profiles results in a discrepancy between electorate and
elected government. In case of Germany it manifests itself in the increasing social tension
and violent protests.
Taking into account the results of the study, some modifications to the election pro-
cedure are proposed to bridge approaches of representative and direct democracy. It is
suggested to introduce the third vote in the form of ’sample referenda’ with voters’ Yes/No
opinions on several important issues from party manifestos. It meets the existing logic
of the German two-vote system: the first vote for a person, the second vote for a party,
and the third vote for party profiles, so that the considerations are getting to be more
conceptual and less personified.
Taking into account the results of the study, we conclude that voting for candidates
or for parties can violate the principle of equal chances, because the parties who are long
at power are over-represented, and the social will is not adequately reflected. Following
the actual trends in job recruitment procedures with anonymized applications and the
focus on job-relevant merits rather than on personal information, the election procedure
could be also complemented with methods of revealing the electorate opinion. The voters
could be (optionally) asked to answer a number of questions relevant to party manifestos
(’sample referenda’) to the end of specifying their political profiles. It meets the existing
logic of the German two-vote system: the first vote for a person, the second vote for
a party, and the third vote for party profiles, so that the considerations are getting to
be more conceptual and less personified. Such an approach could integrate elements of
most advantageous direct democracy into functionally better manageable representative
democracy.
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Figure 6: Indices of parties and coalitions up to three parties having at least half the par-
liament seats if the votes for parties were proportional to their universality; the coefficient
of impact of member weights on the coalition decisions p = 0.50
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7 Annex 1: Computational issues
This section introduces notation and formulas for evaluating parties and their coalitions.
Coalition analysis in terms of stable governments has been considered by Rusinowska et
al. (2005). Relational algebra (Schmidt and Stro¨chlein 1993, Brink et al. 1997) is used to
compute the stable governments in (Rusinowska et al. 2005 and 2006) and (Berghammer
et al. 2007). The vector-matrix formulas adduced below are simpler and have a clear
geometric interpretation.
Questions/Agenda By Q denote the agenda with dichotomous questions q, that is,
which evoke either positive or negative opinions (Yes/No answers) coded by ±1. In our
applications, the list of m = 38 questions is given in the first section of Table 2.
The importance of questions is reflected by weights µq which constitute a probability
measure µ on Q (the reference to “probability” can be misleading; in fact, we just need a
normalized additive measure). It assumes
non-negativity
µq ≥ 0 for every q ∈ Q ,
additivity
µX =
∑
q∈X
µq for every subset X ⊂ Q ,
and normality ∑
q
µq = 1 (the totality is 100%) . (1)
The question weights are collected into the column m-vector
µ = {µq} .
In our application, ‘unweighted’ means equal weights µq = 1/32 for the questions
covered by opinion polls and µq = 1/32 otherwise (to ignore the questions not covered by
the polls). The non-normalized expert weights are shown in the third section of Table 2.
To fulfill the normalizing condition (1), divide each weight by the total of the weights in
the given column.
Candidates Consider N candidates c for election; in our application the candidates are
five parties and DGB. Their positive or negative opinions bqc = ±1 on questions q are
collected into the (m×N)-matrix of candidate opinions derived from the second section
of Table 2
B = {bqc}, bqc = ±1 .
Balance of opinions Imagine a society of voters for the five leading parties. On each
question q, the society falls into protagonists, who answer ’Yes’, and antagonists, who
answer ’No’. On every question q, the balance of opinions aq is the predominance of
protagonists over antagonists, expressed in fraction of the voters. In our consideration,
we assume that the public polls adequately represent the proportion between both groups,
so that the balance of opinions aq is calculated from the normalized balance of opinions
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in the polls (shown by the blue bars in Figure 2). For instance, the balance of opinions
for question ’2. Introduce nation-wide minimal wage’ is calculated as follows
a2 =
52− 43
52 + 43
=
9
95
≈ 0.0947 .
Popularity and universality of the candidates (parties) The representativeness
rqc of candidate c on question q is the size of the voters’ group represented, measured in
fraction (percentage) of the society
rqc =
{
total weight of protagonists in the society if bqc = 1
total weight of antagonists in the society if bqc = −1
.
The popularity of candidate c is the weighted average of his representativeness (=
expected representativeness)
Pc =
∑
q
µq rqc . (2)
The universality of candidate c is the weighted frequency with which he represents a
non-strict majority (= expected rounded representativeness):
Uc =
∑
q:rqc≥
1
2
µq =
∑
q
µq round[rqc] . (3)
In a sense, the popularity reflects the spatial aspect of representativeness, and the
universality reflects its temporal aspect.
Computing the indicators and their geometric interpretation Introduce the
following notation (all vectors are column vectors!):
′ the operation of vector/matrix transpose
. the operation of element-by-element product of vectors and matrices of the same size,
for example, (1, 2) . (3, 4) = (3, 8)
.2 the operation of element-by-element square of vectors and matrices, for example,
(2, 3).2 = (4, 9)
+ the addition of scalars to matrices or vectors by applying it to all matrix elements, for
example, 0.5 + (1, 2) = (1.5, 2.5)
diaga the diagonal (m×m)-matrix with elements of vector a on its main diagonal
signa the m-vector of majority opinions derived from the vector a by applying the sign
function to its coordinates
signaq =


+1 if aq > 0, i.e. the majority opinion on question q is positive
0 if aq = 0, i.e. tie opinion on question q
−1 if aq < 0, i.e. the majority opinion on question q is negative
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δa = 1 − abs(signa) the m-vector of indicators of tie opinion, with the qth coordinate
being 1 if the opinion on question q is tied, and 0 otherwise; we use this vector to
express the total weight of questions with a tie opinion
µ′δa =
∑
q:aq=0
µq (4)
Theorem 1 (Computing the indicators and their geometric interpretation)
R︸︷︷︸
(m×N)-matrix of
representativeness
of candidates c
on questions q
=
1
2
+
1
2
diaga︸ ︷︷ ︸
diagonal
(m×m)-matrix of
balance of opinions
B︸︷︷︸
(m×N)-matrix
of opinions
of candidates c
on questions q
(5)
{Pc}︸ ︷︷ ︸
row N-vector of
popularity of
all candidates c
= µ′R (6)
=
1
2
+
1
2
(
µ .a
)′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ-weighted
m-vector
of balance
of opinions
B︸︷︷︸
(m×N)-matrix
of opinions
of candidates c
on questions q
(7)
{Uc}︸ ︷︷ ︸
row N-vector of
universality of
all candidates c
= µ′round[R] (8)
=
1
2
+
1
2
µ′δa︸ ︷︷ ︸
total weight of
questions with
tie opinions
(constant scalar
independent of c)
+
1
2
(
µ . signa
)′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ-weighted
m-vector
of majority
opinion
B︸︷︷︸
(m×N)-matrix
of opinions
of candidates c
on questions q
, (9)
where a is the vector of balance of opinions.
Thus, the most popular (universal) candidate c has the largest projection of his opinion
vector bc (= the cth column of matrix B) on the µ-weighted vector of balance of opinions
µ .a (respectively, on the µ-weighted vector of majority opinion µ . signa).
The formulas of the theorem are used to compute the indicators for Figure 3.
Remark 1 (Analogy with force vectors in physics)
Recall that in mechanics a work is produced by displacements. Accordingly, the only
productive constituent of a force vector is its projection on the direction of motion. In
Theorem 1, the “work for the society” of a candidate is measured by the projection of
his opinion vector on the “main stream”, the vector of balance of opinions in case of
popularity, or on the vector of majority opinion in case of universality. Thus all the
parties with various opinions are projected onto the ‘vector of political trend’, exactly like
in the case of physical forces.
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Evaluation of coalitions By definition, a coalition C is a subset of the set of candi-
dates. The coalition weight is the total percentage of voters for all the candidates of the
coalition. For instance, the weight of coalition C = CDU/CSU/SPD is 33.8 + 23.0 =
56.8%.
The (relative) weights of members of coalition C are collected in the normalized vector
C
ξ=
{
C
ξc=
ξc∑
c∈C ξc
, c ∈ C
}
.
The matrix of opinions of coalition members is the restriction of B to columns c ∈ C:
C
B= {bqc, c ∈ C} . (10)
The balance of opinions within coalition C is the vector
C
b=
{
C
bq
}
=
C
B
C
ξ . (11)
The (degree of) unanimity of coalition C is the total weight of the questions on which
the coalition members have equal positions. For instance, SPD and CDU agree in 13 of
32 questions, so that its unanimity is 40.6%.
If a coalition C is unanimous on question q then its representativeness rqC is equal
to that of its every member. If the coalition is not unanimous, it can have either pos-
itive, or negative opinion on question q. We assume that on question q a coalition C
represents protagonists with a probability ranging from the relative weight
C
ξ+q of coalition
protagonists to the absolute uncertainty 1
2
:
p
C
ξ+q +(1− p)
1
2
, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
where p denotes the proportionality of impact to weights of coalition members. If p = 1
the impact of coalition members is proportional to their weights. If p = 0 the coalition
has Yes/No opinions with equal chances, so that both protagonists and antagonists are
represented with equal probabilities 1
2
.
Under these provisions, the representativeness and the indicators of popularity and uni-
versality of a coalition are random variables which behavior for non-unanimous questions
depends on the parameter p. The popularity PC and universality UC of coalition C are
understood as its expected representativeness and expected rounded representativeness.
Besides, we compute the variance of representativeness and of rounded representativeness
as a measure of accuracy of the coalition indicators.
Theorem 2 (Evaluation of coalitions)
Unanimity of C = 1− µ′
C
s (12)
PC = E rC = PC︸︷︷︸
=
∑
c∈C
C
ξc Pc
weighted
average
popularity
of coalition
members
−
1
2
(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
impact of
uncertainty
(
µ .a
)′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ-weighted
m-vector
of balance
of opinions
(
C
s .
C
b
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
m-vector
of balance
of opinions
within the
coalition for
non-unanimous
questions
(13)
31
UC = E round[rC ] = UC︸︷︷︸
=
∑
c∈C
C
ξc Uc
weighted
average
universality
of coalition
members
−
1
2
(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
impact of
uncertainty
(
µ . signa
)′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ-weighted
m-vector
of majority
opinion
(
C
s .
C
b
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
m-vector
of balance
of opinions
within the
coalition for
non-unanimous
questions
, (14)
where
C
s=
{
C
sq= sign
(
n−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
c∈C
bcq
∣∣∣∣∣
)}
, are indicators of the coalition non-unanimity on ques-
tions q, with n being the number of coalition members,
PC =
∑
c∈C
C
ξc Pc is the weighted average popularity of coalition members, and
UC =
∑
c∈C
C
ξc Uc is the weighted average universality of coalition members.
Besides, if the coalition opinions on non-unanimous questions are independent (= inde-
pendent negotiations on every question) then
V rC =
1
4
[
(µ .a) .2
]′ [C
s .
(
1− p2
C
b .2
)]
(15)
V round[rC ] =
1
4
[
(µ . signa) .2
]′ [C
s .
(
1− p2
C
b .2
)]
. (16)
The formulas of the theorem with p = 1
2
are used to compute indicators in Table 4
and for Figures 4 and 5.
Remark 2 (Coalition indicators in the simplest case)
If p = 1 (the impact of coalition members is proportional to their weights) then by (13)
and (14) the popularity and universality of a coalition are equal to the weighted average
of corresponding indicators of its members: PC = PC and UC = PC .
Proof of Theorem 1
On every question q, obviously
The weight of non-strict majority/minority =
1
2︸︷︷︸
half
the
society
±
1
2
|aq|︸︷︷︸
predominance
of protagonists
over antagonists
.
Consequently, the representativeness of candidate c on question q is determined by the
the sign of his opinion and by the sign of aq
rqc =
1
2︸︷︷︸
half
the
society
+
1
2
aq︸︷︷︸
predominance
of protagonists
over antagonists
in the society
bqc︸︷︷︸
= ±1
opinion of
candidate c
, (17)
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which matrix form is
R =
1
2
+
1
2
diagaB , (18)
as required in (5). Multiplying µ′ by (18), as required in the definition (2), obtain (6)
and (7):
{Pc} = µ
′R
= µ′

12


1
...
1

+ 12 diagaB


=
1
2
·
∑
q
µq︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+
1
2
µ′diagaB
=
1
2
+
1
2
(µ .a)′B . (19)
To obtain (8), multiply µ′ by round[R], as required by definition (3). To obtain (9),
express the rounded representativeness of candidate c on question q by analogy with (17):
round[rqc] =
1
2
+
1
2
signaq bqc +
1
2
δaq︸︷︷︸
=
{
1 if aq = 0
0 if aq 6= 0
(20)
and proceed similarly to (19).
Proof of Theorem 2
The unanimity of coalition members c ∈ C on question q means that either all bqc = 1,
or all bqc = −1, implying |
∑
c∈C bcq| = n, where n is the number of coalition members.
Consequently,
C
sq = sign
(
n−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
c∈C
bcq
∣∣∣∣∣
)
=
{
0 if c ∈ C are unanimous on question q
1 otherwise
(21)
1−
C
sq = 1− sign
(
n−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
c∈C
bcq
∣∣∣∣∣
)
=
{
1 if c ∈ C are unanimous on question q
0 otherwise
.(22)
Hence, the total weight of the questions on which the coalition is unanimous
Unanimity of C =
∑
q
µq
[
1− sign
(
n−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
c∈C
bcq
∣∣∣∣∣
)]
=
∑
q
µq︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
−µ′
C
s ,
as required in (12).
Compute the expectation and variance of representativeness rqC of a coalition C for a
given question q. Consider two cases.
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• Coalition members are unanimous on question q. Express the coalition’s
representativeness by analogy with (17) and note that rqC is constant, implying
E rqC =
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq︸︷︷︸
=±1 in case of unanimity
(23)
V rqC = 0 . (24)
• Coalition members are not unanimous on question q. The representativeness
rqC is a Bernoulli random variable, taking two values
1
2
± 1
2
aq with range |aq|. The
coalition can accept the opinion of majority in the coalition, or of its minority,
representing respectively the social groups with the size:
1
2
+
1
2
aq sign
C
bq with probability
(
1
2
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
majority in the coalition
p+
1
2
(1− p) (25)
=
1
2
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p ,
1
2
−
1
2
aq sign
C
bq with probability
1
2
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p . (26)
By definition of expectation
E rqC =
1
4
[(
1 + aqsign
C
bq
)(
1 +
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p
)
+
(
1− aqsign
C
bq
)(
1−
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p
)]
=
1
2
+
1
2
aq sign
C
bq
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p
=
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq p . (27)
By the known formula for the variance of Bernoulli random variables (Korn and
Korn 1968, Table 18.8.3, case n = 1, Abramowitz and Stegun 1972, 26.1.20, case
n = 1) obtain
V rqC = a
2
q
(
1
2
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p
)(
1
2
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p
)
=
1
4
a2q

1−
(
C
bq
)2
p2

 . (28)
Compute the popularity PC of a coalition C. Using (23) and (27) and applying (21)–
(22) as indicators of (non-) unanimity, obtain
PC = E rC =
∑
q unanimous
µq
(
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq
)
+
∑
q non-unanimous
µq
(
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq p
)
=
∑
q
µq
(
1−
C
sq
)(
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq
)
+
∑
q
µq
C
sq
(
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq p
)
Identity
=⇒
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=
∑
q
µq
(
1
2
+
1
2
aq
C
bq
)
−
1
2
(1− p)
∑
q
µqaq
C
sq
C
bq
by (10)
=⇒ (29)
=
∑
q
µq
(
1
2
∑
c∈C
C
ξc︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+
1
2
aq
∑
c∈C
C
ξc bqc
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
c∈C
C
ξ c
∑
q
µq(
1
2
+ 1
2
aqbqc)
by (2) and (17)
=
∑
c∈C
C
ξcPc
−
1
2
(1− p)
∑
q
µqaq
C
sq
C
bq
=
∑
c∈C
C
ξc Pc︸ ︷︷ ︸
PC
−
1
2
(1− p)(µ .a)′
(
C
s .
C
b
)
,
as required in (13).
Compute the universality UC of a coalition C. If aq = 0 (tie opinion on question q
in the society) the rounded representativeness round[rC ] = round[
1
2
] = 1. If aq 6= 0, by
analogy with (25)–(26), the rounded representativeness of coalition C takes values
1
2
+
1
2
signaq sign
C
bq with probability
1
2
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p ,
1
2
−
1
2
signaq sign
C
bq with probability
1
2
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣Cbq
∣∣∣∣∣ p .
Applying the indicator of tie opinion (4) and proceeding like in (27) and (29) obtain
UC = E round[rC ]
=
∑
q:aq=0
µq · 1 +
∑
q:aq 6=0
µq
(
1
2
+
1
2
signaq
C
bq
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
c∈C
C
ξ cUc
−
1
2
(1− p)
∑
q:aq 6=0
µq signaq
C
sq
C
bq
︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
q
µqsignaq
C
sq
C
bq
= UC −
1
2
(1− p)(µ . signa)′
(
C
s .
C
b
)
,
as required in (14).
Compute the variance of representativeness rqC of coalition C. Using (24) and (28),
applying (21)–(22) as indicators of (non-)unanimity, and taking into account that the
variance of a sum of independent random variables is the sum of their variances, obtain
V rC =
∑
q
µ2q
(
1−
C
sq
)
· 0 +
∑
q
µ2q
C
sq
1
4
a2q

1− p2
(
C
bq
)2 Identity=⇒ (30)
=
1
4
[
(µ .a) .2
]′ [C
s .
(
1− p2
C
b .2
)]
,
as required in (15).
The derivation of the variance for the rounded representativeness round[rqC ] of coali-
tion C is similar to (30), but there are two changes to be made:
• The range of the Bernoulli random variable round[rqC ] is 1 instead of |aq|, con-
sequently, a2q in (30) should be replaced by 1.
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• If aq = 0 in (30), that is, tie opinion in the society on question q, then rqC =
1
2
,
implying round[rqC ] = round[
1
2
] = 1. Hence, V round[rqC ] = 0. The variances for
such questions q should be nullified by the multiplier (signaq)
2 which retains all
other terms intact.
Thus,
V round[rC ] =
1
4
[
µ.2 . (signa) .2
]′ [C
s .
(
1− p2
C
b .2
)]
,
as required in (16).
8 Annex 2. Polls of public opinion
The references to polls of public opinions used in this paper are collected in Table 10.
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D
ata
sou
rces
Description of survey data
The Wahl-O-Mat question number
and the question (shortly formulated)
Survey
date
Sources (all accessed on Nov 11 2009) Comments
Labour market
2. Introduce nation-wide minimal
wage
Jan 08 http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen und Publika tio-
nen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer 2008/Ja nuar 2008/
17. Relax protection against dis-
missals
May 08 http://www.boeckler.de/32015 92020.html
Economy and taxes
24. Exclusive governmental owernship
of railways
Mar 08 http://privatisierungstoppen.deinebahn.de/download/ emndid-
umfrage-bahnprivatisierung 08-03-27.pdf
10. Equity holding by government in
private banks has to be temporary
Oct 08 http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/2065/
umfrage/einfluss-des-staates-auf-privatbanken/#stat
not exact question, differ-
ent surveys
5. No state control over top-
management salaries*
Mar 09 http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen und Publika tio-
nen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer 2009/Ma erz I/
13. Decrease corporate taxes Oct 09 http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bun
desweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2009/oktober/
28. Reintroduce a wealth tax* Dec 07 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ”Soziale Gerechtigkeit 2007 - Ergebnisse
einer reprsentativen Brgerumfrage”, h ttp://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/bst/de/media/xcms bst dms 23333 23334 2.pdf
not exactly dichotomous
questions
Environment
1. Prolong the operation time of nu-
clear power plants
Jul 09 http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen und Publika tio-
nen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer 2009/Ju li II/
19. Introduce a general speed limit on
Autobahnen (German motorways)
Jul 08 http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1362/
umfrage/ansicht-zur-einfuehrung-eines-generellen-te mpolim-
its/#info
9. Unexceptionally ban experiments
on animals
Aug 03 http://www.greenpeace-magazin.de/index.php?id=3359
26. Authorize production of geneti-
cally modified food*
May 09 http://www.slowfood.de/w/files/pdf neu/meinungen zu
gentechnik 190509.pdf
22. More subsidies for eco-farming x
* Adjustments to non-specified party positions based on public statements, parliament voting, etc.
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Description of survey data
The Wahl-O-Mat question number
and the question (shortly formulated)
Survey
date
Sources (all accessed on Nov 11 2009) Comments
Social policy
36. Increase significantly unemploy-
ment benefits (Hartz IV)*
Oct 09 http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/70305
/umfrage/einschaetzung-der-hoehe-der-hartz-iv-saetz e/#info
32. If wages decrease, pensions can be
reduced*
May 09 http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bun
desweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2009/mai/
31. No Praxisgebuehr (quarterly fee
for medical visits)
Feb 04 http://www.infratest-dimap.de/de/umfragen-analysen/
bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2004/februar/
15. Compensation to parents who use
no public daycares
Nov 09 http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/regierungsp laene-
bruederle-haelt-nichts-von-betreuungsgeld aid 450166.html
no detailed numbers
Education
29. Leave the education policy under
the authority of the states
Aug 09 http://www.eltern.de/familie-und-urlaub/familienpol
itik/bundestagswahl-familie.html?page=9
only survey among par-
ents
34. Leave 3 types of schools with dif-
ferent access to further education
Sep 09 http://www.dphv.de/fileadmin/user upload/news/infot
hek/2009/FORSA-Umfrage Einstellungen zur Einheitssc
hule grafik.pdf
16. Guarantee an apprenticeship
training position for every adoles-
cent*
Dec 07 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ”Soziale Gerechtigkeit 2007 - Ergebnisse
einer reprsentativen Brgerumfrage”, h ttp://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/bst/de/media/xcms bst dms 23333 23334 2.pdf
not exactly dichotomous
questions
7. The first university degree should
be free of tuition fees*
Dec 07 Bertelsmann Stiftung, ”Soziale Gerechtigkeit 2007 - Ergebnisse
einer reprsentativen Brgerumfrage”, h ttp://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/bst/de/media/xcms bst dms 23333 23334 2.pdf, p. 12
not exactly dichotomous
questions (percentage of
the positive answer to
question ”Abolish fees for
studies”)
8. Obligatory language test for all
children of preschool age
x
20. BAFOeG (aid to students and
trainees) regardless of parent in-
come
x
Gender
12. There should be a quota for
women in leading positions
Mar 09 https://www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/sen-gender /frauen-
quote.pdf?start&ts=1244898971
27. Full adoption rights for homosex-
ual couples
Jul 09 http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article41768 30/Zypries-
fordert-Adoptionsrecht-fuer-Homosexuelle .html
non-scientific online sur-
vey with 16000 responses
* Adjustments to non-specified party positions based on public statements, parliament voting, etc.
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Description of survey data
The Wahl-O-Mat question number
and the question (shortly formulated)
Survey
date
Sources (all accessed on Nov 11 2009) Comments
Domestic policy
6. Prohibit secret online surveillance
of private computers
Nov 08 http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen und Publika tio-
nen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer 2008/No vem-
ber II 2008/
25. Retain the compulsory military
service
Oct 06 http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/umfrage aid 117913.html
37. Allow domestic use of German mil-
itary forces against terrorism
Oct 08 http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen und Publika tio-
nen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer 2008/Ok tober I 2008/
14. Introduce referenda at the federal
level
Jun 09 http://www.mehr-demokratie.de/presse-hintergrund.ht ml
23. German politics should follow
Christian values*
Aug 03 http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas 1870-544-1-30.pdf 33 % for more influence,
20% for less influence,
40% accept the current
situation
38. The German democracy is the best
form of government
May 09 http://www.forschungsgruppewahlen.de/Umfragen und P ublikatio-
nen/Archiv weitere Umfragen/Demokratie un d Integration 1/
35. Municipal voting rights for foreign
permanent residents
Jul 06 http://de.statista.com/statistik/diagramm/studie/40
104/umfrage/kommunales-wahlrecht-fuer-alle-auslaend er-in-
deutschland/#info
30. Less restriction on asylum policy x
Foreign policy
3. Immediate withdrawl of German
troops from Afghanistan
Sep 09 http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bun
desweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2009/september-extra/
11. No trade relations with govern-
ments who violate human rights
x
33. General export prohibition of mil-
itary materials
x
European policy
4. Germany should leave the Euro-
pean Union
Oct 08 http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst
/hs.xsl/nachrichten 91928.htm
18. Turkey should be a full member of
the European Union
Jun 09 http://www.rp-online.de/politik/europawahl/Schulz-S PD-wirbt-
fuer-Tuerkei-Beitritt-zur-EU aid 716658.ht ml
* Adjustments to non-specified party positions based on public statements, parliament voting, etc.
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